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j Case No. 930722-CA 
Priority No. 13 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal arises from the district court's refusal to 
grant Dall's request for relief in a petition for extraordinary 
relief. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (g) (Supp. 1993), 
this Court has jurisdiction because Dall was convicted of a 
second-degree felony. 
Dallfs petition requested the trial court to overturn the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board's (PSRB!s) order discharging 
him from the Utah State Hospital and transferring him to the 
Board of Pardons. Dall has conceded in his opening brief that 
the trial court proceeding was a quasi-appellate review of the 
1 
agency hearing. This Court acts as a second level of appellate 
review, primarily reviewing the record of the administrative 
proceedings as well as the evidence placed into the record at the 
trial court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does State v. Buraess. 870 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 1994) 
dispose of Dallfs claims that the PSRB violated the 
constitutional prohibition on "ex post facto11 laws and the 
statutory prohibition on retroactivity? 
2. Was the PSRB's decision that Dall had reached "maximum 
benefit" supported by substantial evidence? 
3. Was Dall's claim that transfer to the prison 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment ripe for adjudication? 
4. Did the PSRB unlawfully exercise judicial power by 
transferring Dall from the state hospital to the prison? 
5. Did Dall have a constitutional right to appeal directly 
from the PSRB!s decision, which was violated by the legislature's 
failure to statutorily provide for direct appeal? 
6. Did the PSRB transfer hearing constitute a part of the 
criminal prosecution, thus entitling him to compulsory process. 
2 
STMPARP OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
When reviewing a trial court decision in a petition for 
extraordinary relief, the appellate court "looks at the 
administrative proceeding as if the petition were brought here 
[to the appellate court] directly, even though technically it is 
the district court's decision that is being appealed. Tolman v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1991). 
Under this standard, this Court gives no deference to the 
district court's initial appellate review because it was a review 
of the record, "which this court is just as capable of reviewing 
as the district court." id; Benni-cn v, State Bdr of Oil, 3ag fc 
Mining. 675 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Utah 1983). 
However, if the trial court took evidence other than the 
administrative record and based its decision, in part, on that 
testimony, this Court defers to the trial court on findings of 
fact resulting from that evidence. Davis County v. Clearfield 
City. 756 P.2d 704, 710 (Utah App. 1988) ("Therefore, insofar as 
the trial court's decision turns on the administrative record, we 
give no particular deference to the trial court. But insofar as 
it turns on the testimony of witnesses, we defer to the trial 
court's advantaged position."), 
3 
Thus, in terms of the appellate standard of review, this 
case presents an unusual bifurcation: reviewing the 
administrative agency record directly without giving deference to 
the trial court1, but reviewing the trial courtfs findings of 
fact based on evidence other than the administrative record by a 
deferential standard. Id. 
In making that review of the PSRB's hearing, the Court 
upholds the agency decision if it based on any evidence of 
substance. Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Com!n. 658 P.2d 601, 607-12 (Utah 1983) .2 In reviewing 
the evidence from the trial court, the Court applies a clearly-
erroneous standard. In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987) . 
1
 Nevertheless, as this Court recognized in Davis County, 
the statement that an appellate court gives no deference to a 
trial court's analysis is "a bit of an overstatement.11 Though 
deference is not required, the appellate court derives "great 
benefit from the trial judge's views on the issue and may be 
persuaded by those views." Id. citing Zions First Natf1 Bank v. 
National Am, Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988). 
2
 Administrative Services discussed the appropriate 
standards of judicial review pre-UAPA. Because this kind of 
hearing before the PSRB was not subject to UAPA, the review 
standard in Administrative Services applies. For more discussion 
on this issue, see Point III. 
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Additionally, the appellant's requirement to marshall t 
evidence applies, Qneida/SLIC v. Oneidd ,.Id Storage and 
Warehouse, Iu» 23b Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 2b (Utah App. April 
1994), although appellant must marshal his evidence from 
cti f tf it 1 ii 11 i\ p I J ii I e^t- k t tnl 
based on the administrative record, then it xs Ixoni the 
administrative record that appellant" marshal Is the evidence 
1 I In I I ( I i l l ! I I | i ( \ e< ii 
the trial court's evidentiary hearing, I lit I is f ron thai 
recoi J that Lh . idiiice ULLJ idislialli I. 
CONgTITWIONAL PRQVIglQNg, gTATIJTEg, m> RVLEg 
liie tollowing authorities are include I i iddendum n. 
U.S. Const, art. 1, b 10, tl. 1. 
TJ S Const in 1 TT 
1 i I n I 
I Const, amend \III. 
I onst amei I f 
Utah coribl. ait. 1, ^ >. 
Utah Const 1 T r n 
I I I n I r I 
Utah CoiioL. a i L . w i l l , ^ ^ Umended u u i j . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-1 (repealed 1992). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 (repealed 1992). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5 (repealed 1992). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (Supp. 1993). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (repealed 1990). 
Utah R.Crim.P. 21.5 (1994)3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
This case is an appeal from the trial court!s quasi-
appellate review of a July 28, 1991 hearing before the PSRB, at 
the conclusion of which the PSRB decided that Dall had reached 
maximum benefit from the services available at the Utah State 
Hospital and should be transferred to the Utah State Board of 
Pardons. (R. at 568). The PSRB ordered Dall held in the 
3
 When the legislature deleted court rules from the 
statutory code in 1989, the Judicial Council adopted most of the 
then-existing rules without change. Rule 21.5, Utah Rules of 
Criminal -Procedure is identical then to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
21.5 (repealed 1990) except that subsections (c) and (d) were not 
approved by the Supreme Court on the basis of State v. Copeland. 
765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988). Because the rule has not been amended 
to keep up with the various changes in the statutory procedures 
for treatment of the mentally ill, such as the dissolution of the 
PSRB, much of the rule as presently written is meaningless. For 
purposes of this brief, appellee will cite to the statutory 
version of this language as it existed before its repeal. 
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physical custody of the hospital until the Board of Pardons held 
a htaiinj iu J l^iruuJL/ assumed j uiisdictiun I lal at 9 1 ) . 
Before the Boaid could hold that hearing, however, Dall 
filed this petition and received a stay of the PSRB fs oidei (F 
a I "I " I "1 ill 1 | M I 1ML , r i I I i i il i 1 1 
court level, the stay was in effect and Dall remained at the 
hospital, on June 14 1991 the trial court convened an 
evidentiary hearing and, on August 4 i*Mi IIOITII I Irvonq 
arguments (R nt 5 n l ) . The court issued a memorandum decision 
cit '• : ' '" tp que si 1« i i ell el « mil lilt inq 
the stay. -,F ^ 492-50.;, . 
Shortly afterward, Dall filed a motion to vacate the 
judqm«Mit MI , in I In rill HI i HI M H , h i H J i.ei«» I t i H I I y i LI l I i . 
Dall received ariuthei stay prevent inq execution of the 1991 PSRB 
order mil 1 i jJing on the post-judgment motions (P at 517) 
The trial court denied the post indqment motions and issued 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions ot Law on Novembei 1 € 1993. 
(I I I i I i I i 
On December 22, 1993, the Board of Pardons held a hearing 
and I iitkill^ assumed l u i u d n L i u n over Kill Before the prison 
could transfer him, however, Lhis Coin I f n \ 1 tranpfpi in I I; 
oral argument on the motion for stay for January i J ^fter 
7 
oral argument on Dallfs motion, this Court lifted the stay it had 
imposed on December 23, 1993. 
Statement of Facts 
Dall pled guilty and mentally ill in 1989 to two 
second-degree felonies: one count of forcible sexual abuse and 
one count of kidnapping. Third District Court Judge Timothy 
Hanson ordered Dall sent to the Utah State Hospital for a mental 
evaluation. On August 10, 1989, Judge Hanson issued an order 
transferring Dall to the jurisdiction of the PSRB. After hearing 
from Dall's treating physician at the hospital, Dr. Philip 
Washburn, the PSRB decided that Dall had reached maximum benefit 
and should be transferred to the Board. Before the Board of 
Pardons could formally assume jurisdiction, however, Dall 
obtained a stay from Third District Court Judge Scott Daniels and 
filed this petition. Dall also filed an appeal in this Court 
from the PSRB's decision. (Dall v. State of Utah, Case No. 
910273-CA). The appeal was later dismissed due to lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. (R. at 571). 
The PSRB initially considered Dall's transfer on April 19, 
1991 and determined that he should be transferred to the 
jurisdiction of the Board. However, the recording equipment 
malfunctioned and, in order to perfect Dall's appeal, this Court 
8 
ordered the PSRB to hold the hearing again. Thus, jn June 28, 
1*1 flir P hL Iv I 1 r 7 I \ i i in | I It u I il | in i " d-iiet'il i 
conduct as closely as possible Lu the original hearing. IULL 
Call Vt Utah State Board of Pardons and PSRB. case No Qirm-* 
Tr. of Hearing befoir PSFP 1 i } I M 1 ' I it I M U M 's 
Exhibit No 1) . 
I» Wdblil nil 1 ( 1 i 1 11 I I II il T i l l li i I t . auhi 1 i p I a t e a u ajiJ 
h i s c o n d i t i o n had s t a b i l i z e d t o t h e p o i n t t h a t he no l o n g e r 
r e q u i r e d t h e s e r v i c e s of t h e h o s p i t a l . (££, a t 41) However, 
I>i W i 111 i in i I i i l l 
treatment, although the tier il IIH ill would be of a stabilizing, 
i a the L than a curative, nature, liuli i i 1 I r Washburn stated that 
w e i e ±i nui iUL Ddll * t> ciiminal sentence, the hospital probably 
would have already discharged him fi ntn the hospital Lt another 
set I i II j U ! r 
At the- conclusion of the hearing, the PSRB found that 
Dali had reached a plateau in hi^ treatment" and "for all 
practical purposes had reached maximum I MII I t ft I h | I 
stay," (M. at firl Hi t1i»se groun I I PSRB ordered Dall 
tiaiksleiif I I I liihJ il" 1 1 1 I Hi i mi ( *y in 
the physical custody ot the Board pending further action. (Id,) 
9 
Three individuals testified before the trial court at the 
June 4, 1993 evidentiary hearing: Br. Washburn; Br. Robert 
Howell; a psychologist who had evaluated Ball; and Robert 
Verville, formerly superintendent of the state hospital and 
current associate director of the Utah Bivision of Mental Health. 
Br, Washburn testified to the statements he made at the PSRB 
hearing in 1991. Additionally, Br. Washburn gave his opinion 
that based on his interview with Ball the week before, and review 
of the medical notes, Ball's condition had not changed since the 
time of the evidentiary hearing in 1991. (R. at 636-37) . 
Verville discussed the state hospital's clinical standards 
in deciding whether a patient should be transferred to the Board. 
He testified that the legislative codification of the term 
"maximum benefit" did not change hospital policy, as it had been 
practiced in 1988 or 1989. (R. at 697-99). Verville stated that 
throughout Ball's time in the hospital, the practice had remained 
the same. Id. Verville also testified about the mental health 
conditions at the state prison and the effect of a recent federal 
consent decree on continuing improvements at the prison. (R. 
691-95). 
10 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Dall makes numerous challenges to the PSRB's decision to 
transfer him to the Board, including ex post facto, 
retroactivity, lack of sufficient evidence, cruel and unusual 
punishment, separation of powers, and violation of sixth 
amendment rights. None of these claims have merit. Due to the 
doctrine of stare decisis, the claims regarding ex post facto and 
retroactivity have already been answered in the case of State v. 
Burgess. 870 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 1994). 
Additionally, the PSRB's was based on substantial evidence 
that Dall had reached maximum benefit and should be placed in the 
Utah State Prison system instead of the hospital. There was 
evidence before the PSRB, reiterated at the trial level, showing 
that Dall had reached a plateau in his condition that warranted 
transfer. 
ARCTMENT 
I. THIS COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V. BURGESS. 870 
P.2D 276 (UTAH APP. 1994) DISPOSES OF DALL'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE PSRB BASED UPON THE PROHIBITIONS 
ON EX POST FACTO AND RETROACTIVE LAWS. 
On February 15, 1994, this Court issued a decision in State 
v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 1994), in which it held that 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 did not violate the ex 
11 
post facto clause or an illegal application of a statute 
retroactively. Burgess was convicted of a criminal offense and 
sent to the Utah State Training School. When he was committed, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-8(4) (repealed 1992) simply stated that 
the Board of Pardons would decide whether a defendant, proposed 
to be discharged from the hospital, should be placed on parole or 
committed to prison. Burgess, 870 P.2d at 278. During Burgess1 
commitment at the school, the legislature repealed section 77-
16a-8 and enacted in its place Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203. 
Section 77-16a-203 establishes a detailed process for review 
of individuals criminally committed to the state hospital. That 
review requires both the hospital and the prison to create teams 
of clinicians who evaluate the patient and make a recommendation. 
Id- n. 1. Because section 77-16a-8 had been repealed, the 
training school was unclear as to the procedure that had to be 
followed to transfer Burgess to the prison. Thus, the county 
attorney went before the Court seeking an order stating the 
appropriate procedure to follow.4 
4
 Apparently, the school sought Burgess1 transfer because 
he could not be securely maintained at the facility and was not 
accepting treatment. Burgess. 870 P.2d at 276. 
12 
The trial court in Burgess ruled that the current statute, 
section 77-163-203, governed Burgess1 placement and ordered him 
maintained at the school pending proceedings consistent with that 
law. id- Burgess appealed from the order. On appeal, Burgess 
argued that the application of section 77-16a-203 was ex post 
facto illegally retroactive. This Court denied both claims, for 
three different reasons. 
First, this Court ruled that the statute governing the 
placement process in the repealed statute, section 77-16a-8, was 
not a "vested" right in which Burgess had a protectible interest. 
Xd. at 278. As stated by the Court, the transfer process was not 
part of Burgess1 sentence but merely a placement procedure that 
was not "ripe until the recommendation for transfer was 
submitted."5 Id. 
Second, the Court also ruled that application of current law 
would not violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto 
laws. Id- at 279,n. 3. The ex post facto clause prohibits the 
state from imposing a harsher or more burdensome punishment than 
could have been imposed when the crime was committed. Id. 
5
 The recommendation for Burgess1 transfer was not 
submitted until October 1992, after section 77-16a-203 became 
law. 
13 
Burgessf sentence did not increase as a result of the change in 
the transfer process: both before and after the enactment of the 
law, Burgess was subject to three consecutive one-to-fifteen year 
sentences. 
Finally, the Court also ruled that even accepting Burgess1 
retroactivity claim, application of the new law still would not 
be unlawfully retroactive because it changed only procedure. Jj£. 
Statutes that make only procedural changes in the law, i.e., in 
the "judicial machinery for enforcing rights," are not improper. 
See State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) . 
Thus, the trial court's decision to apply current law in Burgess1 
case did not violate either the ex post facto or retroactivity 
prohibitions. 
Although non-material facts are different, the legal 
analysis and conclusions here parallel those in Burgess. In 
1988, when Dall committed his crime, and in 1989, when he was 
sentenced, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (repealed 1990) allowed 
transfer when the hospital "proposes to discharge" a person who 
had been adjudicated guilty and mentally ill. As recognized in 
Burgess in its interpretation of similar language in section 77-
16a-8, this provision did not require discharge into the 
community but only discharge from the hospital to the 
14 
jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons, fturgess. 870 P.2d at 279, 
n. 6. 
Statutory language when Dall committed his crime contained 
no guidance to steer either the hospital's discretion in 
discharging him or the Board's discretion in committing him to 
prison. As a result of the 1990 amendment, which added the term 
"maximum benefit," both the state hospital and the PSRB were 
obligated to find that Dall had reached a certain level of 
stability to transfer. Thus, as in Burgess, application of the 
1990 "maximum benefit" statute did not harm Dall's case or make 
his transfer more likely. Due to the imposition of the maximum 
benefit standard, the state was statutorily obligated to meet a 
higher burden to effect transfer than under the old statute. 
Neither the legislature's addition of the term "maximum 
benefit" nor the PSRB's application of it to Dall, violated the 
ex post facto or retroactivity proscriptions, namely because use 
of the standard did not disadvantage Dall. The testimony before 
the trial court at the evidentiary hearing showed that indeed the 
maximum benefit codification essentially adopted the hospital's 
practice before 1990. The following colloquy contains Mr. 
Verville's testimony on the matter: 
15 
Q [Mr. Beadles] In the review process that you 
oversaw, and transferring somewhat to the PSRB, or 
making that recommendation, what was the standard, what 
clinical standard, in your opinion, was used and looked 
at in 1989? 
[Objection omitted] 
THE WITNESS Again, as I tried to indicate 
earlier, it was a clinical standard wherein the 
treating psychiatrist and his clinical team would 
review the progress of the inmate, or excuse me, the 
patient, and determine whether or not he had received 
everything that the hospital had to offer for 
opportunities for improvement with his condition. 
Q [BY MR. BEADLES] Were those the same criteria that 
were used in 1991? 
A Yes. 
Q Are you familiar with the term "maximum benefit"? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know where that term came from? 
A My understanding of where that term came from was 
out of the creation of the guilty-mentally ill law, and 
it's a standard that is currently being used at the 
hospital now for referral. It, however, maintains, to 
my understanding, that same definition that I gave you. 
Itfs not a written, defined term. Ifs simply the 
clinical team, including the psychiatrist and his 
clinical team making the recommendations that this 
person has benefitted as much as they can offer. 
Q As you see it [unintelligible] looking back over 
the years that you've been involved in this process, 
the term "maximum benefit" is a codification of policy 
and practice of the Utah State Hospital from 1989 to 
the present? 
16 
A Right. If anything, it's becoming more stringent 
in that there's more review now than there was in 1989. 
• * * 
Q All right. Going back to 1989-1991, 
differentiating those two standards, in your opinion, 
was the standard used in 1991 harsher than the 1989 
standard? 
A I would see them as being very similar at that 
time. 
Q And that is in the sense that it puts the same 
type of burden on the State Hospital and the PSRB to 
make that determination? 
[Objection omitted] 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
(R. at 697-99). 
Thus, the evidence at trial established that the hospitalfs 
pre-1990 policy corresponded with the "maximum benefit" standard 
in 1990. Even if the hospital had used the pre-1990 transfer 
provision (which contained no standards), the result would have 
been no different.6 
6
 In an attempt to circumvent this problem in the case, two 
weeks before the evidentiary hearing, Dall argued in his pre-
trial brief that the state hospital and the PSRB were obligated 
to use a different standard: Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 (1990), 
which prohibits transfer of certain offenders unless the director 
of the state hospital certifies that they have "sufficiently 
recovered" from their mental illness. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 
(1990). Not only was this claim never raised at the PSRB hearing 
(and thus waived pursuant to Smith v. Batchelor. 832 P.2d 467, 
470 n.4 (Utah 1992)) or in either the original or amended 
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In State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that stare decisis applied to the several 
panels of this Court, Therefore, "the first decision by a court 
on a particular question of a law governs later decisions by the 
same court." Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1269. This case is identical 
in fact and law to Burgess: thus, under the doctrine of stare 
decisis, Dall's claims must be answered similarly to those in 
Burgess- 2s& State v, Shculderblade, 858 p.2d. 1049, 1051 (Utah 
App. 1993) (co-defendant separately appealed his conviction on 
same issues and facts; therefore, decision in co-defendantfs 
appeal served as binding precedent under doctrine of stare 
decisis). 
II. BECAUSE DALL FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF EITHER THE PSRB'S OR THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION, THIS COURT SHOULD ACCEPT BOTH SETS OF 
FINDINGS AS VALID. 
Dall challenges the PSRB's decision to transfer Dall and the 
trial court's affirmance of that agency decision. However, he 
has failed to carry the "heavy burden appellants must bear when 
petitions, this claim is simply wrong. Judge Hanson clearly 
stated that he was sentencing Dall pursuant to the guilty and 
mentally ill provisions of section 77-35-21.5. (Tr. Hearing 
before Judge Timothy Hanson, Third District Court, State v. Dall. 
Case Number 8819911695, July 28, 1989, at 63-64; Petitioner's 
Exhibit No. 5). Section 77-16-5 applies to individuals who are 
found guilty, a plea separate from guilty and mentally ill. 
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challenging factual findings." Qneida/SLIC. 236 Utah Adv. at 25. 
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for appellants, in 
general, to marshall the evidence adequately. Dall, in 
particular, also has failed to meet that obligation. 
As stated in Qneida/SLIC. the first step in marshalling the 
evidence is to present ffl every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists.111 JL£; citing West Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). After appellant 
has marshalled the supporting evidence, he must then show why the 
courtfs findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence, 
i.e., the "fatal flaw." Qneida/SLIC. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25. 
When an appellant has failed to marshall the evidence in support 
of the trial court's factual findings, this Court has 
consistently refused to review the findings and has accepted them 
as valid. As in Qneida/SLIC. Dallfs recitation of the evidence 
from both the agency and trial court hearings, are merely 
"carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony in 
support of [his] position." Id. Dall has not marshalled the 
evidence in support of the PSRBfs or trial court's findings; 
therefore, this Court should accept both sets of findings as 
valid. 
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III. THE PSRB HAD BEFORE IT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT ITS OPINION THAT DALL HAD REACHED MAXIMUM 
BENEFIT FROM THE SERVICES AVAILABLE AT THE STATE 
HOSPITAL; THEREFORE, THE AGENCY'S DECISION WAS 
CORRECT AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
In reviewing an administrative agency action, this Court 
affirms the decision if based on substantial evidence. SEMECO 
Industriesr Inct v, Utfrh s m e Tax Com'n, 849 p.2d 1167, 1172-
1173 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J. dissenting); Utah Department of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service Com'n, 658 P.2d 601, 
607-12 (Utah 1983). Administrative Services was the supreme 
Court's leading interpretation of the standards by which a court 
reviewed agency actions before enactment of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). 
Because the PSRB was exempted from UAPA, the standard of 
review set forth in Administrative Services should also govern 
this Court's review of the PSRB hearing. The pre-UAPA 
"substantial evidence test" provided less latitude for judicial 
review than the current UAPA standard of the same name. SEMECO. 
849 P.2d at 1173. In Administrative Services, the Court 
interpreted the test to mandate affirmance of an agency finding 
whenever "evidence of any substance whatever" supports the 
findings of fact." id. citing Administrative Services/ 658 p.2d 
at 609. Thus, just as the trial court was bound to afford 
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significant deference to the PSRB, so this Court is similarly 
bound. 
The evidence at the PSRB hearing, repeated at the trial 
court, was that Dall had received all the help from the state 
hospital that he could receive from the hospital and that the 
state prison could provide him the same treatment. Although Dall 
points out that he will need treatment for the rest of his life, 
chronological duration is not the focus of the maximum benefit 
test. That test is met if the facts show the following: (1) the 
patient has received medication and other forms of treatment at 
the hospital and his mental functioning has improved; (2) the 
patient's condition has remained stable for a reasonable time; 
and (3) the state hospital has no additional medications or 
therapeutic forms of treatment that will further improve the 
patient's mental condition; and (4) another institution, such as 
the prison, can provide treatment suitable to maintain the 
patient's current condition. 
Any other definition makes a mockery of the guilty and 
mentally ill laws. As the state conceded, from the layman's 
viewpoint any person would "benefit" more from serving his entire 
sentence at the state hospital rather than prison. However, this 
suggested interpretation, if made law, would transform the state 
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hospital into the permanent warehouse for all individuals who 
have been convicted as guilty and mentally ill. The PSRB's 
interpretation better balances the conflicting interests in the 
guilty and mentally ill placement process: administering 
punishment appropriate for the offense while also enabling the 
mentally ill to receive medication and treatment that will lead 
to a stable mental condition. This interpretation also reflects 
the most logical intent of the legislation, and conforms with the 
agency's past practice. 
The PSRB's decision to transfer Dall appropriately met the 
definition of "maximum benefit." The trial elicited additional 
evidence supporting the PSRB's transfer decision that Dall had 
reached maximum benefit: Dr. Washburn stated his opinion that 
Dall's condition had not changed since the PSRB hearing in 1991. 
(R. at 636-37). 
IV. DALL'S CLAIM THAT HE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IF THE TRANSFER WERE ALLOWED TO 
PROCEED IS NOT RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION AND IS 
SPECULATIVE; THEREFORE, IT IS NOT A GROUND FOR 
OVERTURNING THE PSRB'S DECISION. 
Dall's cruel and unusual punishment claim is not ripe for 
adjudication. Dall has never been at the prison; therefore, the 
prison simply never has subjected Dall to any type of punishment. 
Even if the ripeness issue could be overcome, the claim that the 
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prison is going to subject Dall to cruel and unusual punishment 
is speculative at best. In essence, Dall asked the trial court 
to give him a declaratory judgment that the prison is unable, as 
a matter of law, to confine him in a manner consistent with the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause. 
The "unnecessary rigor" provision of the state constitution 
does not lend support to Dallfs argument. When the constitution 
was drafted, the word "rigor" meant "sternness, harshness, 
cruelty," "that which is harsh or severe; especially an 
injustice, oppression or cruelty." The Century Dictionary of the 
English Language 5181 (1890-1891). This definition does not 
create a separately enforceable standard but merely adds strength 
to the "cruel and unusual" language contained in the balance of 
the provision. Utah Const, art. I, § 9. 
More fundamentally though, Dall's basic claim that the 
prison could not treat him properly also is without merit. All 
the witnesses who testified stated their opinion, based on 
experience from working at the prison, that it had a commendable 
program that recently had been significantly improved. Dall 
himself introduced a copy of a settlement agreement and consent 
decree from the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah in which the prison agreed to significantly improve its 
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mental health unit, even beyond constitutional minima. Henry v. 
Deland. Civil No. 89-C-1124J, April 1, 1993, Order and 
Stipulation; Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3). 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial 
court stated that it had reviewed the settlement agreement and 
concluded that "the facilities at the mental health unit are 
neither inadequate, nor cruel and unusual." (R. at 573). Again, 
Dall has not marshalled the evidence in support of this finding 
and, therefore, this Court should consider it valid. 
Oneida/SLIC, 236 Utah Adv. at 25. 
V. THE PSRB DID NOT ENCROACH UPON JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS; 
THEREFORE, THE DECISION TO TRANSFER DALL WAS NOT A 
VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article V of the Utah Constitution divides the powers of 
state government into three separate departments -- the 
legislative, executive, and judicial. Utah Const, art. V. It 
provides that no person charged with the exercise of powers 
belonging to one department can exercise the functions 
appertaining to another. Thus, article V is violated only if 
action of one branch encroaches upon the constitutionally 
guaranteed power or authority of another. Mutart v. Pratt. 51 
Utah 246, 170 P. 67 (1917). 
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In Mutart. the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the 
indeterminate sentencing law did not violate the separation of 
powers clause. In that decision, the Court stated: 
The right of the court to inflict any punishment at all 
is given it by the Legislature, and without some act on 
the part of the lawmaking power no such power or duty 
would be vested therein; and for that reason I fail to 
see wherein the act in question [enactment of the 
indeterminate sentencing law] deprives the court of any 
power or authority guaranteed to it by the Constitution 
of this state. 
Mutart. 170 P. at 68. Although the power to impose a sentence is 
statutorily vested in the courts, the power to create a 
sentencing system is not. Were a court to impose a sentence not 
authorized by law, that imposition of sentence would violate the 
legislature's sole authority under article V. 
The PSRB did not exercise a judicial function when it 
transferred jurisdiction to the Board of Pardons.7 Judge Hanson 
already had carried out the judicially-authorized function of 
imposing sentence. The PSRB was merely carrying out that 
sentence pursuant to its lawful powers and authority. Judge 
Hanson expressly committed Dall to the jurisdiction of the PSRB. 
7
 This conclusion logically follows from this Court's 
decision in Burgess that the transfer procedure was not part of 
the sentence, but merely an administrative placement process. 
Thus, this part of Dall's claim also can be resolved via Burgess 
pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis. 
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That grant of jurisdiction brought with it all the lawful powers 
and authority that the legislature gave to the PSRB. One of 
those powers was to decide when Dall was subject to discharge 
from the hospital. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (repealed 1990). 
VI. THE LEGISLATURE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE DIRECT 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE PSRB DECISION DOES NOT 
VIOLATE DALL'S RIGHT TO AN APPEAL. 
Article VIII of the state constitution creates and defines 
the jurisdictional authority of the courts. Utah Const, art. 
VIII, § 8 (1984). The constitution gives district courts 
"original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute. . . . " Jji. Further, that same 
provision states that all other courts shall have original and 
appellate jurisdiction only as provided by statute. X&- The 
constitution itself only grants courts the power to issue 
extraordinary writs. J&. Except for extraordinary writs then, 
the legislature has the constitutional authority to establish the 
jurisdiction of the courts. 
Before the PSRB hearing at issue here, the legislature chose 
to withdraw the right to appeal a decision of the PSRB in this 
type of case.8 That right was completely within the 
8
 To the extent Dall claims his inability to directly 
appeal the PSRB!s action violated his rights under article I, 
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legislature's power and, contrary to Dallfs argument, did not 
leave him without a remedy. In DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board 
of Appeals. 764 P.2d 627 (Utah App. 1988), this Court held that 
an administrative agency action can be appealed only if a statute 
explicitly creates the right of appeal. Otherwise, a person must 
seek review through the "traditional means" of extraordinary 
writ. DeBry. 764 P.2d at 628. As discussed previously in this 
brief, this case provided Dall with precisely that type of 
review. 
VII. THE PSRB'S HEARING WAS NOT A CRITICAL STAGE IN THE 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND# THEREFORE, DOES NOT 
REQUIRE COMPULSORY PROCESS. 
By the time the PSRB decided to transfer Dall, he already 
had pled guilty and been sentenced to two terms of one to fifteen 
years incarceration. Tr. Hearing before Judge Hanson, Third 
District Court, State v. Dall. Case No. 881991695, July 28, 1989, 
at 64) . 
section 12, this claim too is met by Burgess• The PSRB simply is 
not a part of the criminal process; thus, none of its actions 
involve the class of persons, i.e., those accused of criminal 
offenses, entitled to the rights granted by article I, section 
12. Additionally, if Dall believed that this Court's decision to 
dismiss the direct appeal due to lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction was unconstitutional, he should have filed a 
petition for certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court. 
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As part of that sentence, Dall was committed to the 
jurisdiction of the PSRB to be placed in the state hospital for 
appropriate treatment. Again, as clarified in Burgess, the PSRB 
did not create a new sentence; it simply carried out the judge's 
order and the legislature's sentencing system. This process does 
not constitute a part of sentencing. In Gardner v. Florida. 43 0 
U.S. 349, 358 (1977), the United States Supreme Court stated that 
a defendant "has a legitimate interest in the character of the 
procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he 
may have no right to object to a particular result of the 
sentencing process.11 (emphasis added). 
Because the PSRB hearing did not impose sentence, but merely 
executed a lawfully imposed sentence, the hearing before the PSRB 
was not a critical stage entitling him to compulsory process. 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the decision of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ^ %h day of August 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
WifJy 
Ja/mes H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Sec. 10. [Powers denied the states.] 
[1.] No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; 
emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a 
tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, as post 
facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, or 
grant any title of nobility. 
[2.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any 
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be 
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the 
net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on 
Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the 
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision 
and Control of the Congress. 
[3.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any 
duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, 
enter into any Agreements or Compact with another State, or with 
a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in 
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead 
Corporation 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process of law 
and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead 
Corporation 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead 
Corporation 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead 
Corporation 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines - Cruel punishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall 
not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead 
Corporation 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead 
Corporation 
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objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in order to 
avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in 
the case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence, 
it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive 
judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be 
made after the court has instructed the jury. Unless 
otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon tune 
for argument shall be within the discretion of the 
court. i960 
77-35-20. Rule 20 — Exceptions unneces-
sary [Repealed effective July 1, 1990]. 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are un-
necessary. It is sufficient that a party state his objec-
tions to the actions of the court and the reasons there-
for. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling 
or order, the absence of an objection shall not thereaf-
ter prejudice him. i960 
77-35-21. Rule 21 — Verdict [Repealed ef-
fective Ju ly 1, 1990]. 
(a) The verdict of the jury shall be either "guilty" 
or "not guilty," "not guilty by reason of insanity," 
"guilty and mentally ill," or "not guilty of the crime 
charged but guilty of a lesser included offense," or 
"not guilty of the crime charged but guilty of a lesser 
included offense and mentally ill" provided that when 
the defense of mental illness has been asserted and 
the defendant is acquitted on the ground that he was 
insane at the time of the commission of the offense 
charged, the verdict shall be "not guilty by reason of 
insanity." 
(b) The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall be re-
turned by the jury to the judge in open court and in 
the presence of the defendant and counsel. If the de-
fendant voluntarily absents himself, the verdict may 
be received in his absence. 
(c) If there are two or more defendants, the jury at 
any time during its deliberations may return a ver-
dict or verdicts with respect to any defendant as to 
whom it has agreed. If the jury cannot agree with 
respect to all, the defendant or defendants as to whom 
it does not agree may be tried again. 
(d) When the defendant may be convicted of more 
than one offense charged, each offense of which the 
defendant is convicted shall be stated separately in 
the verdict. 
(e) The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the 
offense charged or to any offense necessarily included 
in the offense charged or an attempt to commit either 
the offense charged or an offense necessarily included 
therein. 
(f) When a verdict is returned and before it is re-
corded, the jury shall be polled at the request of any 
party or may be polled at the court's own instance. If, 
upon the poll, there is not unanimous concurrence, 
the jury may be directed to retire for further delibera-
tions or may be discharged. If the verdict is unani-
mous, it shall be recorded. 
(g) If judgment of acquittal is given on a verdict or 
the case is dismissed and the defendant is not de-
tained for any other legal cause, he shall be dis-
charged as soon as the judgment is given. If a verdict 
of guilty is returned, the court may order the defen-
dant to be taken into custody to await judgment on 
the verdict or may permit the defendant to remain on 
bail. 1963 
77-35-21.5. Rule 21.5 — Plea claiming men-
tal i l lness or insanity — Expenses of 
examination and treatment — Proce-
dures — Verdict — Sentence — Com-
mitment — Discharge — Prison sen-
tence — Parole — Commitment to Psy-
chiatric Security Review Board — Pro-
bation [Repealed effective July 1, 
1990]. 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being 
tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court shall 
hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine 
the claim of mental illness of the defendant. Mental 
illness, for this purpose, is determined by the defini-
tion stated in Subsection 76-2-305(4). The court may 
order the defendant to be evaluated at the Utah State 
Hospital or any other suitable facility, and may re-
ceive the evidence of any private or public expert wit-
ness whose evidence is offered by the defendant or the 
prosecutor. A defendant who tenders a plea of "guilty 
and mentally ill" shall be examined first by the trial 
judge in compliance with the standards for taking 
pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be advised that a 
plea of guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty and 
not a contingent plea. If the defendant is later found 
not to be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise lawfully 
made remains a valid plea of guilty. The defendant 
shall be sentenced as any other offender. If the court 
concludes that the defendant is currently mentally 
ill, applying the standards set forth in this section, 
the defendant's plea shall be accepted and he shall be 
sentenced as a mentally ill offender. Expenses of ex-
amination, observation, or treatment, excluding 
travel to and from any mental health facility, shall be 
charged to the county. When the offense is a state 
offense, the state shall pay all of the expense. Travel 
expenses shall be charged to the county where prose-
cution is commenced. Examination of defendants 
charged with municipal or county ordinance viola-
tions shall be charged to the municipality or county 
commencing the prosecution. 
(2) (a) If a defendant at trial asserts a defense of 
"not guilty by reason of insanity," the court shall 
instruct the jury that it may find the defendant 
guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insan-
ity, guilty and mentally ill, guilty of a lesser of-
fense, or guilty of a lesser offense due to mental 
illness but not an illness which would warrant 
full exoneration. 
(b) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to 
the offense charged, or any lesser offense, the 
court shall hold a hearing as provided in this 
section, and if the court finds that the defendant 
is currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the 
defendant as a mentally ill offender. 
(3) If the defendant is found guilty and mentally 
ill, the court shall impose any sentence which could 
be imposed wide** law upon 8 defendant who is con-
victed of the same offense. Before sentencing, the 
court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defen-
dant's present mental state. 
(4) The court shall, in its sentence, order commit-
ment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2 and 
hospitalization at the Utah State Hospital if, upon 
completion of the hearing and consideration of the 
record, the court finds by clear and convincing evi-
dence that: 
(a) the defendant has a mental illness as de-
fined by Subsection 76-2-305(4); 
(b) because of his mental illness the defendant 
poses an immediate physical danger to others or 
self, which may include jeopardizing his own or 
others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a 
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correctional or probation setting, or lacks the 
ability to provide the basic necessities of life, 
such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on 
probation; 
(c) the defendant lacks the ability to engage in 
a rational decision-making process regarding the 
acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated 
by evidence of inability to weigh the possible 
costs and benefits of treatment; 
(d) there is no appropriate treatment alterna-
tive to a court order of hospitalization; and 
(e) the Utah State Hospital is able to provide 
the defendant with treatment, care, and custody 
4Ehat is adequate and appropriate to the defen-
dant's conditions and needs. 
(5) The period of commitment to the jurisdiction of 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board under this sec-
tion may in no circumstance be longer than the maxi-
mum sentence imposed by the court. 
(6) (a) When the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board proposes to discharge a defendant from the 
Utah State Hospital prior to the expiration of 
sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of Par-
dons a report on the condition of the defendant, 
including the clinical facts, the diagnosis, the 
course of treatment, the prognosis for the remis-
sion of symptoms, the potential for recidivism 
and for the danger to himself or the public, and 
recommendations for future treatment. The 
Board of Pardons shall direct that the defendant 
serve any or all of the unexpired term of the sen-
tence at the Utah State Prison, place the defen-
dant on parole, or commit the defendant to the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board for conditional release in accordance with 
Chapter 38. 
(b) If the Board of Pardons, under law or ad-
ministrative rules, considers for parole any de-
fendant who has been adjudged guilty and men-
tally ill, the Board of Pardons shall consult with 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board. An addi-
tional report on the condition of the defendant 
may be filed with the Board of Pardons. Pending 
action of the Board of Pardons, the defendant 
shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Psychi-
atric Security Review Board at the Utah State 
Hospital. 
(7) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board shall review the condition of each person 
under its jurisdiction at the state hospital under this 
section to determine whether custody can be trans-
ferred to the Board of Pardons. 
(8) If the defendant is placed on parole, treatment 
shall, upon the recommendation of the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board, be made a condition of parole. 
Failure to continue treatment or other condition of 
parole except by agreement with the designated men-
tal health services provider and the Board of Pardons 
is a basis for initiating parole violation hearings. The 
period of parole may not be for fewer than five years 
or until the expiration of the defendant's sentence, 
whichever comes first, and may not be reduced with-
out consideration by the Board of Pardons of a cur-
rent report on the mental health status, of the of-
fender. 
(9) (a) A defendant who pleads or is found guilty 
and mentally ill who is placed on probation by 
the sentencing court shall be placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board. The Psychiatric Security Review Board 
shall make treatment a condition of probation if 
the defendant is shown to be treatable and facili-
ties exist for treatment of the offender in a proba-
tion status. Reports as specified by the trial judge 
shall be filed with the probation officer and the 
sentencing court. 
(b) Failure to continue treatment or other con-
dition of probation, except by agreement with the 
treating agency and the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board, is a basis for the initiation of proba-
tion violation hearings. The period of probation 
may not be for fewer than five years or until the 
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever 
comes first, and may not be reduced by the sen-
tencing court without consideration of a current 
report on the mental health status of the of-
fender. 
(c) Treatment or other care may be provided 
by or under contract with the Division of Mental 
Health, a local mental health authority, or, with 
the approval of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board, any other mental health provider. A re-
port shall be filed with the probation officer and 
the sentencing court every three months during 
the period of probation. If a motion on a petition 
to discontinue probation is made by the defen-
dant, the probation officer shall request a report. 
A motion on a petition to discontinue probation 
may not be heard more than once every six 
months. 
(10) (a) With regard to persons committed by the 
court to the Utah State Hospital or other facility 
under this section prior to July 1,1989, the effec-
tive date of this act, the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital, or his designee, shall peti-
tion the court within 60 days after that date for 
review of those orders. The court shall review 
and modify those orders to include commitment 
to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board established under Section 77-38-2. 
(b) With regard to persons who have been 
placed on probation by the sentencing court un-
der Subsection (9) prior to July 1,1989, the effec-
tive date of this act, the executive director of the 
Department of Corrections, or his designee, shall 
petition the court within 60 days after that date 
for review of those orders. The court shall review 
and modify those orders to include placement un-
der the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2. 
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77-35-22. Rule 22 — Sentence, judgment 
and commitment [Repealed effective 
July 1, 19901. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or 
plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for impos-
ing sentence which shall be not less than two nor 
more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless 
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, oth-
erwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may com-
mit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or 
recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant am opportunity to make a statement in his 
own behalf and to present any information in mitiga-
tion of punishment, or to show any legal cause why 
sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting at-
torney shall also be given an opportunity to present 
any information material to the imposition of sen-
tence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be 
tried in his absence, he may likewise be sentenced in 
his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sen-
Rule 21.5. Plea claiming mental illness or insanity - Expenses of 
examination and treatment - Procedures - Verdict - Sentence -
Commitment - Discharge - Prison sentence - Parole - Commitment to 
Psychiatric Security Review Board - Probation. 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a 
defendant to any charge, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine the claim of mental illness of the 
defendant. Mental illness, for this purpose, is determined by the 
definition stated in Subsection 76-2-305(4). The court may order 
the defendant to be evaluated at the Utah State Hospital or any 
other suitable facility, and may receive the evidence of any 
private or public expert witness whose evidence is offered by the 
defendant or the prosecutor. A defendant who tenders a plea of 
"guilty and mentally ill" shall be examined first by the trial 
judge in compliance with the standards for taking pleas of 
guilty. The defendant shall be advised that a plea of guilty and 
mentally ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent plea. If 
the defendant is later found not to be mentally ill, a guilty 
plea otherwise lawfully made remains a valid plea of guilty. The 
defendant shall be sentenced as any other offender. If the court 
concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill, applying 
the standards set forth in this section, the defendants plea 
shall be accepted and he shall be sentenced as a mentally ill 
offender. Expenses of examination, observation, or treatment, 
excluding travel to and from any mental health facility, shall be 
charged to the county, except when the offense is a state 
offense, the state shall pay all of the expense. Travel expenses 
shall be charged to the county where prosecution is commenced. 
Examination of defendants charged with municipal or county 
ordinance violations shall be charged to the municipality or 
county commencing the prosecution. 
(2) (a) If a defendant at trial asserts a defense of "not 
guilty by reason of insanity," the court shall instruct the jury 
that it may find the defendant guilty, not guilty, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, guilty and mentally ill, guilty of a lesser 
offense, or guilty of a lesser offense due to mental illness but 
not an illness which would warrant full exoneration. 
(b) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to the 
offense charged, or any lesser offense, the court shall hold a 
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hearing as provided in this section, and if the court finds that 
the defendant is currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the 
defendant as a mentally ill offender. 
(3) If the defendant is found guilty and mentally ill, the 
court shall impose any sentence which could be imposed under law 
upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense. Before 
sentencing, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the 
defendant's present mental state. 
(4) The court shall, in its sentence, order commitment to the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board established 
under Section 77-38-2 and hospitalization at the Utah State 
Hospital if, upon completion of the hearing and consideration of 
the record, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that: 
(a) the defendant has a mental illness as defined by 
Subsection 76-2-305(4); 
(b) because of his mental illness the defendant poses an 
immediate physical danger to others or self, which may include 
jeopardizing his own or others1 safety, health, or welfare if 
placed in a correctional or probation setting, or lacks the 
ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, 
clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation; and 
(c) the Utah State Hospital is able to provide the 
defendant with treatment, care, and custody that is adequate and 
appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs. 
(5) The period of commitment to the jurisdiction of the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board under this section may in no 
circumstance be longer than the maximum sentence imposed by the 
court. 
(6) (a) When the Psychiatric Security Review Board proposes to 
discharge a defendant from the Utah State Hospital prior to the 
expiration of sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of Pardons 
a report on the condition of the defendant, including the 
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course of treatment, the 
prognosis for the remission of symptoms, the potential for 
recidivism and for the danger to himself or the public, and 
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recommendations for future treatment. The Board of Pardons shall 
direct that the defendant serve any or all of the unexpired term 
of the sentence at the Utah State Prison, place the defendant on 
parole, or commit the defendant to the jurisdiction of the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board for conditional release in 
accordance with Chapter 38. 
(b) If the Board of Pardons, under law or administrative 
rules, considers for parole any defendant who has been adjudged 
guilty and mentally ill, the Board of Pardons shall consult with 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board. An additional report on 
the condition of the defendant may be filed with the Board of 
Pardons. Pending action of the Board of Pardons, the defendant 
shall remain under the jurisdiction of [the] Psychiatric Security 
Review Board of the Utah State Hospital. 
(7) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security Review Board 
shall review the condition of each person under its jurisdiction 
at the state hospital under this section to determine whether 
custody can be transferred to the Board of Pardons. 
(8) If the defendant is placed on parole, treatment shall, upon 
the recommendation of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, be 
made a condition of parole. Failure to continue treatment or 
other condition of parole except by agreement with the designated 
mental health services provider and the Board of Pardons is a 
basis for initiating parole violation hearings. The period of 
parole may not be for fewer than five years or until the 
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever comes first, 
and may not be reduced without consideration by the Board of 
Pardons of a current report on the mental health status of the 
offender. 
(9) (a) A defendant who pleads or is found guilty and mentally 
ill who is placed on probation by the sentencing court, shall be 
placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board. The Psychiatric Security Review Board shall make treatment 
a condition of probation if the defendant is shown to be 
treatable and facilities exist for treatment of the offender in a 
probation status. Reports as specified by the trial judge shall 
be filed with the probation officer and the sentencing court. 
(b) Failure to continue treatment or other condition of 
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probation, except by agreement with the treating agency and the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board, is a basis for the initiation 
of probation violation hearings. The period of probation may not 
be for fewer than five years or until the expiration of the 
defendant's sentence, whichever comes first, and may not be 
reduced by the sentencing court without consideration of a 
current report on the mental health status of the offender. 
(c) Treatment or other care may be provided by or under 
contract with the Division of Mental Health, a local mental 
health authority, or, with the approval of the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board, any other mental health provider. A report 
shall be filed with the probation officer and the sentencing 
court every three months during the period of probation. If a 
motion on a petition to discontinue probation is made by the 
defendant, the probation officer shall request a report. A motion 
on a petition to discontinue probation may not be heard more than 
once every six months. 
(10) (a) With regard to persons committed by the court to the 
Utah State Hospital or other facility under this section prior to 
July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the superintendent 
of the Utah State Hospital, or his designee, shall petition the 
court within 60 days after that date for review of those orders. 
The court shall review and modify those orders to include 
commitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board established under Section 77-38-2. 
(b) With regard to persons who have been placed on 
probation by the sentencing court under Subsection (9) prior to 
July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the executive 
director of the Department of Corrections, or his designee, shall 
petition the court within 60 days after that date for review of 
those orders. The court shall review and modify those orders to 
include placement under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board established under Section 77-38-2. 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIRK W. DALL, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, : 
VS. : CASE NO. 910902993 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., : 
Respondents. : 
The Court having heard this matter and ruled, and now reviewed 
petitioner's and respondent's proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and the Objections to them, now enters these 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner's request for extraordinary relief was 
originally filed May 10, 1991, and was subsequently amended. 
2. Petitioner requested relief under Rules 65B(b), (c) and 
(e) , challenging the finding of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board ("PSRB") that Mr. Dall had received "maximum benefit from 
treatment" and should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the 
Board of Pardons. 
3. On May 9, 1989, Mr. Dall entered a plea of guilty and 
mentally ill to one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse and one count of 
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Kidnapping, both second degree felonies. Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
ordered that Mr. Dall be transported to the Utah State Hospital for 
diagnostic evaluation. 
4. On August 10, 1989, Judge Hanson issued an order 
transferring Mr. Dall to the jurisdiction of the PSRB. 
5. The PSRB held a hearing on April 19, 1991, and entered 
its Order dated April 24, 1991, finding that Mr. Dall had received 
maximum benefit, and should be transferred to the jurisdiction of 
the Board of Pardons. 
6. Petitioner filed his petition on May 10, 1991. An appeal 
to the Court of Appeals was also filed. A stay was obtained from 
Judge Scott Daniels. Upon Judge Daniels' retirement, Judge Iwasaki 
was assigned. He recused himself, and this Court was appointed. 
7. Due to a problem with the recording equipment used, no 
record was made of the April, 1991 hearing. 
8. An additional hearing was held on July 28, 1991 and has 
been transcribed. The Court of Appeals ordered the PSRB to hold 
the hearing. All parties to the hearing expressed their 
understanding that the new hearing was to correlate to the April 
19, 1991 hearing. 
9. The State called no witnesses at the June 28 hearing. 
Dr. Philip Washburn was called and examined by counsel for Mr. 
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Dall, and cross-examined by the State. Dr. Washburn testified that 
Mr. Dall had not received maximum benefit from treatment, and that 
Mr. Dall must receive some treatment for the rest of his life. Dr. 
Washburn testified that Mr. Dall had reached a "plateau" in his 
treatment and was not progressing as rapidly as the Hospital would 
like, but that Mr. Dall would still benefit from further treatment 
at the Hospital. Mr. Dall was returned to the State Hospital. 
10. On July 2, 1991 the PSRB issued a second order finding 
that Mr. Dall had received maximum benefit and should be 
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons. 
11. At the time Mr. Dall was committed to the jurisdiction of 
the PSRB, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-38-2(6) provided for judicial 
review of determinations of the PSRB. 
12. Effective March 13, 1990, Section 77-38-2(6) was amended 
to provide appeal only for persons found not guilty by reason of 
insanity. 
13. Effective March 13, 1990, Section 77-16a-5 was enacted, 
providing a maximum benefit standard for transfer from the 
Hospital. (This section was repealed July 1, 1992, but the same 
standard is currently codified in Section 77-16a-203(3)(a)(ii)). 
14. Mr. Dall appealed the PSRB's decision to the Court of 
Appeals, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
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The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Dall had no right of appeal 
from the PSRB's decision. 
15. An evidentiary hearing before this Court was held on June 
14, 1993, with closing arguments heard on August 4, 1993. 
16. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Verville testified on 
behalf of the State that the Hospital did not interpret the maximum 
benefit standard as relaxing the standard for transfer of a person 
to the Board of Pardons. 
17. Mr. Verville testified that the Hospital applied a 
clinical standard in assessing petitioner's mental condition. 
18. This Court issued a minute entry reflecting a decision on 
August 13, 1993. 
19. Petitioner filed post-judgment motions pursuant to Rules 
52(a), 59(e) , and 62(b) and (d) , on August 19, 1992. In this 
Court's absence, an ex-parte stay order was signed by Presiding 
Judge Michael R. Murphy, pending further order of this Court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner's request for relief is denied. 
2. This action is properly analyzed under Rule 65B(e) 
("where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
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abused its discretion"). To the extent petitioner relies on Rule 
65B(b) (wrongful imprisonment) and Rule 65B(c) (other wrongful 
restraints on personal liberty), such claims are found to be 
inappropriate and are dismissed with prejudice. 
3. There is no substantive difference, at least in their 
application, between the Hospital's clinical practice in 
transferring guilty and mentally ill individuals before 1990 and 
after the statutory adoption of the maximum benefit standard in 
199CK 
4. The State Hospital's policies and procedures for transfer 
under the applicable statutes were not arbitrary and capricious, 
and therefore were in conformity with the law. 
5. Because transfer under the applicable statutes at the 
time of Mr. Dall's commitment to the PSRB in 1989, and at the time 
of 1991 PSRB hearing were, for all intents and purposes identical, 
application of the "maximum benefit" standard to Mr. Dall does not 
make imposition of Mr. Dall's punishment more burdensome, and thus 
does not violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal or Utah 
Constitutions. 
6. This Court cannot find that the conditions at the Utah 
State Prison constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The mental 
health unit at the Utah State Prison is capable of meeting Mr. 
Dall's medical and mental health needs, as they presently exist. 
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7. A review of the 30 page Settlement reached between the 
parties in Henrv v. Deland. Civil No. 89-C-1124J (D. Utah), 
convinces the Court that the facilities at the mental health unit 
are neither inadequate, nor cruel and unusual. 
8. The treatment issues and Mr. Dall's mental condition, and 
the appropriateness of his transfer from the State Hospital to the 
jurisdiction of the state's Board of Pardons, are all issues that 
are particularly within the purview and expertise of the PSRB. 
9. The Board was not exercising a clearly judicial function 
when it transferred jurisdiction of Mr. Dall to the Board of 
Pardons. Judge Hanson had already carried out the judicially-
authorized function of imposing sentence in 1989. The Board was 
merely carrying out that sentence in accordance with their lawful 
powers and authority. 
10. Where there is no statute specifically authorizing 
judicial review, review may be had by "traditional means" of 
extraordinary writ. 
11. The PSRB's action does not violate the separation of 
powers provision of the Utah Constitution. 
12. The lack of an appeal right from decisions of the PSRB 
for persons other than those found not guilty by reason of insanity 
does not violate Mr. Dall's right to appeal under Article I, 
0C5 
DALL V. STATE PAGE SEVEN FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
Sections 7 and 12, and Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
13. The PSRB's transfer decision does not constitute 
imposition of a sentence, but is merely reflective of the execution 
of a lawfully imposed sentence. The hearing before the PSRB was 
not a critical stage of the proceedings entitling petitioner to 
compulsory process (or financial access to expert testimony). 
14. The petitioner's request that the decision of the PSRB be 
set aside is denied. 
15. This Court's Order Of Stay is lifted, based upon the 
foregoing. s^~} 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following, this, of November, 1993: 
Mark R. Moffat 
Robert K. Heineman 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James H. Beadles 
Lorenzo K. Miller 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorney for Respondents 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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